A love letter to Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution

Disclaimer: I am writing about Japanese politics, but I am a resident, and not a citizen of Japan. While it should go without saying that if there were a circumstance in which it were needed, I would volunteer to help the JSDF, I legally am not a citizen and cannot. Also, I can't vote, so please take this opinion as just that, an opinion.


Article 9 of the Japanese constitution states, in the official English translation:

Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

Article 9 was originally intended to limit Japan's military capability by postwar allied occupation. As early as 1948, however, efforts were made by the allies to request rearmament in some form (Japanese wikipedia). Unfortunately for those allied efforts though, Article 9 remains and is effectively unchanged. Public opinion polling on changing it in any way ranges from wildly unpopular to mildly unpopular, depending on the particular text changes proposed.

The best guess for the current public opinion is probably a 2025 poll by Yomiuri, which indicates that 80% do not favor revision of the first paragraph, but do support limited modification to the second paragraph. The key here is that over time, Japan has built a quasi-militarized state with the creation of the Japan Self-Defense Force, or JSDF. The JSDF has been affirmed to be legal in courts, but many believe that it needs formal legitimacy in the form of a constitutional amendment. The Japanese public's opinion can be divined through polling to be some combination of this:

  1. Fundamentally, the pacifism clause is fine.
  2. Japan should be allowed to defend itself, and perhaps its allies, if attacked, and needs the JSDF to exist to do this.
  3. The JSDF's current capabilities are limited because of the constitution, preventing it from obtaining some weapons, which makes Japan weaker than neighbors by virtue of being intentionally disarmed.

My belief is that Article 9 is fine as-is, and should not be amended.

Paragraph 1 is more poetic than paragraph 2, but it does create a fundamental basis for the vesting of paragraph 2, so it is very important, even without specific terms. Article 1, both internally and externally, conveys the intent of the Japanese government to be non-aggressive, and more importantly, to not allow using force to settle international disputes.

Paragraph 2 receives the most criticism, because depending on how you interpret it, the JSDF should not exist. But I believe very fundamentally that this is a non-issue. The courts have reaffirmed the right of the JSDF to exist, and fundamentally, the status quo with the JSDF existing has been maintained since the postwar constitution, and through far greater international disputes between other powers. Article 9 remained unchanged despite the cold war, the vietnam war, and various middle-east conflicts.

I believe, fundamentally, that the status quo is fine. Even though the JSDF is not enshrined in the constitution, it does exist in practice, and serves its role as a deterrent to attack quite well.

I believe an unchanged article 9 is a statement to potential aggressors to not attack Japan. Despite the fact that the JSDF is a defense force, it is substantially armed and can retaliate against aggressors quite well. On the other hand, article 9 restrains the government from involving itself in other wars. This creates a legal shield: other countries can count on Japanese neutrality, or at the least, noncombatant role in any wars. This makes Japan a formidable noncombatant force, but simultaneously ensures that it will not be attacked in times of conflict, or asked to join conflicts in which it would be attacked.

Modern wars are initiated by other powers, like the United States, and when the US comes knocking asking for backup, that is the exact moment when article 9's value comes through: an individual leader is incapable of immediate response to things that do not directly threaten Japan. In the United States-Japan summit at the start of the 2026 Iran war, Article 9 was tested and proved useful, preventing Japan from committing anything to the US outside of reconnaissance and post-ceasefire work.

This is why I believe that now, Article 9 serves a critical role not just in domestic politics, but in foreign affairs. Japan is fundamentally protected, for its own good, from being dragged into unwanted international conflicts that don't concern it.


On a fundamental basis, I believe that militarization from any state should be halted at the current progress point. State belligerence leads to instability. Even under the guise of stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons, state belligerence should not be pursued as a form of conflict resolution.